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ABSTRACT: This lecture considers the place of Reductio ad Absurdum (RAA) in an informal 
theory of argumentation. It asks the question: How should RAA be classified in modern 
argumentation theory? I’m particularly interested in how this argument would fit in the pragma-
dialectical, threefold of argumentation schemes. I will – at least provisionally – argue that 
informal use of RAA consists of three kinds of reasoning, one of which belongs to the 
argumentation scheme of sign, one of which belongs to the argumentation scheme of 
comparison, and one of which is not an argumentation scheme, but consists in pointing out 
inconsistencies in the commitments of the opponent. This typology differs from that made by 
others (Ryle, 1945, p. 6; Groarke, Tindale & Fisher, 1997, p. 177; Schwed, 1999, p. 734-735). 
Although this lecture is not concerned with legal reasoning, its occasion is. In 
jurisprudential literature the term RAA is used to indicate reasoning which makes an appeal to 
the absurd consequences of an initial premise (Alexy, 1989, p. 283; Golding, 1884, p. 38, 59; 
MacCormick, 1978, p. 114 ff.). With this form of reasoning a certain interpretation of a legal rule 
is rejected on the grounds of its consequences, which would be unacceptable, meaningless, 
incomprehensible or the like (Alexy, 1989, p. 283). This definition leaves room not only for 
‘ordinary’ arguments by which an appeal is made to undesirable consequences but also for 
arguments that appeal to other kinds of consequences—for example: artificial insemination by 
donor cannot be a ground for adultery, for, if it were, a consequence would be that it is possible 
to commit adultery with a dead person (MacCormick, 1978, p. 148). In this example a certain 
interpretation is denied because its consequence is not just undesirable but creates a legal 
inconsistency, because it contradicts well-known juridical facts.  
The differences in kinds of consequences led Kloosterhuis (2003) to conclude that we 
should distinguish between two kinds of RAA. The first – which he calls the wider sense of RAA 
– consists of pragmatic argumentation. The second – which he calls the strict sense of RAA – 
can be classified as a contextual-harmonization argument (MacCormick & Summers, 1991, p. 
513): the kind of argument by which it is determined whether a certain interpretation fits within 
the legal system. However, in my view there is no reason to use the name RAA for specific 
instances of pragmatic argumentation. Pragmatic argumentation is just pragmatic argumentation. 
In RAA the relationship between antecedent and consequence cannot be adequately 
characterised in terms of causality. When it is argued that artificial insemination by donor cannot 
be a ground for adultery, for, if it were, the consequence would be that one can commit adultery 
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with a dead person, this consequence does not seem to be literally caused by the antecedent. 
Instead one would say that the relationship between antecedent and consequence is one of logical 
necessity in the imagined world of the antecedent. And this means that with regard to RAA one 
should not talk about practical consequences that are absurd because they are undesirable, but 
instead about consequences that are absurd because they contradict well-known facts or 
generally accepted opinions.  
Nonetheless, literature about juridical argumentation obviously shows confusion at this 
point. In order to be able to adequately evaluate the argument, one must know what the argument 
precisely amounts to. A review of argumentation theory shows that RAA is not commonly 
understood as pragmatic reasoning, although some authors implicitly or maybe coincidentally 
classify it that way.
1
 However, this observation does not help us answer the question how RAA 
should be classified in modern argumentation theory. 
The roots of RAA lie in ancient Greek mathematics (Kneale & Kneale, 1962, p. 7 ff.). At 
that time the argument was commonly named reductio ad impossibile (in Greek hê eis to 
adunaton apagôgê [Aristotle, Prior Analytics 29b6]). This is the method of indirect proof, e.g. 
the method of proving the irrationality of √2 by assuming that √2 is rational. This form of 
mathematical argument is characterised by the fact that the assumption being made in the first 
premise is self-contradictory, i.e. that the initial premise entails consequences that contradict 
each other (for more detail about self-contradiction, see Ambrose, 1944; Govier, p. 217-218).  
The method of RAA can also be recognised in Plato’s dialogues, where Socrates uses it to 
refute his adversary’s stance by inducing concessions that lead to a contradiction with this 
stance. In the Meno, Plato uses the example that virtue is not teachable, for, if it were, the sons of 
Pericles, Themistocles and Aristides would have been virtuous, whereas reality shows that they 
are not. Kneale & Kneale (1962, p. 9) suggest that this method of reduction is what Plato in his 
middle period considers to be dialectic. This use of RAA differs from the mathematical use 
because the consequence that can be drawn from the assumption is not self-contradictory, but 
just establishes a falsehood.  
 According to Kneale and Kneale (1962, p. 9) the term reductio ad absurdum is 
considered more appropriate in the non-mathematical use of RAA than reductio ad impossibile. 
On the other hand Rescher (The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
www.iep.utm.edu/r/reductio.htm) thinks the term ad absurdum more suitable for a self-
contradiction (the strict, mathematical use), whereas, to convey a looser sense of the absurdity of 
the consequence, he would apply the terms ad falsum and ad impossibile when the consequence 
is a falsehood, or ad ridiculum or ad incommodum when it is an implausibility or anomaly. 
 Much of the modern literature on RAA is concerned with its logical analysis. The kind of 
RAA in which a positive statement A is proved by hypothetically stating its opposite and 
drawing untrue or ridiculous consequences from it, ends in a double negation of the statement: 
¬A → F; ¬F (F is known to be false); ¬¬A (by modus tollens). This double negation can only be 
reverted to the positive statement A by the law of excluded middle or the double negation rule, 
which are considered disputable rules in some logical systems (Historisches Wörterbuch der 
Philosophie). Although very interesting in themselves, these analyses do not concern me here. 
My interest lies in the informal use of RAA. In the literature on non-formal argumentation theory 
examples are given and different versions of RAA are distinguished. From these I have drawn a 
preliminary classification of three types of RAA. 
 
1
 In their evaluation criteria Tindale and Gough (1987, p. 16-17) also speak of a ‘causal development that leads to 
the conclusion.’  
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The first type of RAA is a subtype of the argument of sign: 1. It is not true that people 
basically like killing, 1.1 If this were true, everybody would be a serial killer, 1.1 That is 
obviously not the case (falsehood).
2
 In this kind of argument, the standpoint is necessarily 
descriptive: it expresses a state of affairs. In the implicit argument (1.1) it is stated that the 
consequence of the assumption expresses a falsehood (also descriptive). The relation between 
antecedent and consequence is one of logical necessity: in a world where people like killing, 
everybody necessarily must be a serial killer. This argument can be compared with a ‘normal’ 
argument of sign: 1. It is not true that people basically like killing, 1.1 We’re not all serial killers, 
1.1 If we’re not all serial killers, then it is not true that people basically like killing. The RAA 
version and the normal version of this argument consist of the same elements, for the implicit 
premise in the normal version (1.1) can be read (by modus tollens) as the explicit premise (1.1) 
in the RAA version.  
The second type of RAA is a subtype of the argument by analogy. Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969, p. 207) and Tindale and Gough (1987) connect this kind of argument 
with an ironical refutation of someone’s view. An example: 1. The assurance that threats [like 
warnings on a package of cigarettes] do not have desired consequences, or even invite the 
opposite, is nonsense (is not true), 1.1 If it were true, the Penal Law might as well be repealed (in 
other words, Penal Law would also be ineffective), 1.1 That is a ridiculous thought.3 In this 
example the standpoint is descriptive, although that does not seem a necessary characteristic of 
this kind of RAA. It is also possible to find examples with an evaluative standpoint.
4
 An incitive 
standpoint, however, would not be appropriate. Accordingly, the ridiculous thought mentioned in 
the implicit argument represents an evaluation or establishes a falsehood. The relationship 
between antecedent and consequence is one of comparison: if one thinks something to be the 
case, one must necessarily also believe something else (a comparable thing) to be the case. 
However, the comparable thing is so absurd that it entails the rejection of the antecedent.  
 The third type of RAA consists in pointing out inconsistencies in the commitments of the 
opponent. Rescher (The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy) calls it ‘doctrinal annihilation’ and 
I’ve taken the following example from him. Socrates’ accusers had charged him with 
godlessness. They also accused him of believing in inspired beings (daimones). But then 
inspiration must mean divine inspiration, as daimones are supposed to be beings inspired by a 
god. Socrates defended himself in asking them: how is it possible that someone does not believe 
in gods when he is acknowledged to believe in god-inspired beings? In doing so he points out the 
self-contradiction of his accusers’ claim, which shows its absurdity. Spelled out, the argument 
would run: 1. The accusation – that I do not believe in a god – makes no sense, 1.1a If I didn’t 
believe in any god, I would not believe in inspired beings, 1.1b You accuse me of believing in 
inspired beings, 1.1a-b If you accuse me of inconsistent beliefs, the accusation is nonsense.  
A systematic classification of kinds of argument is a prerequisite for a satisfactory 
analysis and evaluation of argumentation. Argument types differ as soon as other evaluation 
criteria are needed. The criteria provided in literature primarily focus on the contradiction 
between the consequence and presumed facts or opinions: it is not enough for the contradiction 
 
2
 The numeration is taken from pragma-dialectics (see van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992, e.g. p. 87); the 
example is taken from a Dutch newspaper. 
3
 Example drawn from a Dutch newspaper. 
4
 Examples drawn from literature: The notion of ‘potential life’ is a bad argument against abortion. The statement 
that one should always return what has been borrowed from a friend when asked to do so, is unsound. The statement 
that it’s foolish to lock a car since a determined thief can still break in, is nonsense.  
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to be a simple contrary, it must exhaust the possibilities (Nolt, 1984, p. 158-159; Tindale and 
Gough, 1987, p. 16; Hoaglund, 2004, p. 424). Another criterion is asking whether the conclusion 
is actually absurd (Barnet & Bedau, 1993, p. 190; Crossley & Wilson, 1979, p. 166; Tindale and 
Gough, 1987, p. 17). Hoaglund also requires that ‘the inference from one step to the next must be 
strong’ (see also Tindale and Gough, who nevertheless call this inference the causal development 
that leads to the conclusion). In my lecture I will relate these kinds of evaluation criteria to the 
different elements of the schemes that I have distinguished. 
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